When I discovered Drew Gilpin Faust's edition of Augusta evans's novel, _Macaria; or Altars of Sacrifice_ while working on a college research paper, I was excited to find an example of the writing of a woman I had read brief mentions of in various books and an example of fiction published in the South during the Civil War. Although Evans's writing is flawed, as was pointed out even during her lifetime, when writing was often more flowery, by occasional digressions to show off Evans's learning--as when one of the duel heroines has been observing the stars through her telescope and muses on astronomical history--Evans's story is compelling and valueable. The story concerns two heroines living in Mobile, where Evans lived by this time: Irene Huntingdon, who has been raised in luxury but seeks to be strong and to find meaning in her life instead of simply spending her time and her father's wealth on fashion and shallow socializing, and Irene's poorer, artistic friend, Electra Grey, with whom Irene remains friends despite both a longstanding grudge that Irene's father holds against Electra's family and Irene and Electra's enduring love for the same man. Faust explains in the introduction that a Union general banned his soldiers' reading of _Macaria_, which had been republished by her antebellum New York publisher soon after its publication; while Evans's southern characters often showed too much materialism, snobbery, and insensitivity to make the South seem like an unquestionably superior region, her refusal to write as if she accepted the by then explicit northern view of slavery as a centrally important issue in the war and her portrayal of her central characters' personal growth do give strong signs of why the general who banned it might have worried that it would weaken some people's commitment to restore the union and to accept the view of the war, promoted by the time of its publication, as a fight against slavery. A final reason for _Macaria_'s value is its resolution of the question of women's role in the South, regardless of class, at least as viewed in the emergency period of the civil War; _Macaria_ does not end with the usual conventions of nineteenth-century domestic novels, and Faust's introduction provides some mixed contemporary southern reactions to the way in which Evans chose to end her heroines' story.

This book tlls all about how people lived in the early times... from free blacks to slave blacks... and from slave blacks to slaveholders... great information... especiall for doing research stories...!!

I applaud the author for her attempts at telling a story through the eyes and words of her son. The concept is correct, the method is not. The story rambles, often jumping from topic to topic. The "handwritten" font is creative, but actually hard to read. It could have been so much more effective to have this book written by someone with more legible printing. The photos are at times compelling, but others are too obscure for children to interpret. I bought this book for my seven-year-old son, to help him understand my four-year-old autistic son. There were some helpful thoughts, but this book seemed to create more confusion and questions for him.

This is a terrific book! It helped my in-laws understand my son better. They had thought autism was as it is in TV movies - silent, non-responsive, unreachable children. Their grandson certainly wasn't like that, he got good grades, so he wasn't autistic. Now they realize that when I say my son is autistic I'm not insulting his intelligence, but refering to the way his mind works.

WE HAVE AN AUTISTIC 9 YEAR OLD CHILD, DIAGNOSED AT AGE 3. TO DATE, WE HAVE YET BEEN ABLE TO FIND A BOOK THAT IS NOT OVER-ANALYTICAL, NOT TO MENTION WAY OVER OUR HEADS CONCERNING HOW TO BETTER UNDERSTAND THE EVERYDAY REASONING AND ACTIONS OF OUR SON. AFTER READING THIS BOOK, I HAVE IMMEDIATELY GROWN CLOSER AND MORE APPRECIATIVE OF MY CHILD AND HIS DISABILITY. I HAVE FOUND MYSELF, SINCE READING THE BOOK, NOT GETTING SO EASILY UPSET WITH HIM. THERE ARE "AUTISTIC" THINGS HE DOES THAT UPSET ME SINCE I KNOW THEY ARE THE BY-PRODUCTS OF HIS CONDITION BUT AFTER READING THE BOOK, I BETTER UNDERSTAND THAT THERE IS SOMETHING INSIDE HIM THAT IS CAUSING THIS, NOT HIM TRYING TO HURT OR IRRITATE US WITH CERTIAN ACTIVITIES, EVEN DOWN TO HOW HE RESPONDS TO HIS ENVIRONMENT AND OTHERS. OF COURSE I HAVE AM AWARE OF ALL THE "SYMPTOMS" AND I AM LIVING THEM, BUT THIS BOOK IS SO REAL AND INTIMATE IN ITS DEPICTION OF AN AUTISTIC CHILD'S MIND THAT EVERY PARENT OF AN AUTISTIC CHILD (NO MATTER HOW MILD) AS WELL AS THOSE CLOSE TO THEM, MUST READ THIS BOOK! CONGRATULATIONS KAREN FOR A SHINING ACHIEVEMENT! WHAT A REWARD YOU WILL RECEIVE FOR YOUR HARD WORK AND WILLINGNESS TO HELP OTHERS UNDERSTAND.

The main benefit of this book is to provide an overview of international economic forms of cooperation in the 20th century. That overview is, however, flawed by simplifications that often distort rather than illuminate that historical view. The argument about what must be done next is incomplete and unsatisfying. This book is written for the reader who has some college-level training in economics, and is interested in the interaction between national politics and international economics.

The basic argument is that free markets create excesses which can only be eliminated by international intervention. Such interventions were frequent and reasonably effective during the period just prior to World War I and in the free world after World War II. Professor Gilpin argues that parochial American leadership since the end of the cold war has undermined the international political system for stabilizing the international economy. He calls for stronger American leadership in forging a better coalition with the European Union countries and Japan.

The central thesis of the book is sound in one area: Unrestrained capital flows can create distortions in a world in which everything else (businesses, people, and trade flows) are not nearly so unrestrained. The problem here is that these rapid capital flows out of a country primarily occur because of years of earlier abuses (as I describe in The Irresitible Growth Enterprise) such as speculative spending on infrastructure and investments that are not needed (as happened in several Southeast Asian countries prior to their currency crises in 1998).

Virtually every problem that Professor Gilpin warns against and wants to solve with international authority is really created by poor national economic policies. We would probably create sounder world economic growth if we focused on encouraging all nations to pursue sound lending, appropriate national borrowing, and constructive trade policies (our attention is usually focused on the last). Where governments are weak or corrupt, abuses will always develop and linger. My counterargument would be that strong democracies will almost always pursue reasonably sound economic policies. Solve that problem of governmental form and effectiveness of political process at the national level, and the world economy will be sound. If this counterargument is right, then we may need a second generation of informational efforts in favor of effective democracy, in the same way that one was needed during the cold war through Radio Free Europe and Voice of America.

At another level, much of what is described here as weaknesses and problems can be attributed to weak currencies. Again, informational efforts and research could help countries with weak currencies appreciate how to strenthen those currencies. Certainly, pegging to stronger currencies is proving to be effective in many cases. Pegging to a basket of stronger currencies might work even better. There could even be a role for pegging to sound economic policies to change expectations, as some South American countries have done.

Many of the worldwide risks today relate to the U.S. trade imbalance. In the same way that greater public awareness and an economic boom led to eliminating the U.S. budget deficits, the trade imbalance can be solved. Again, this is a national issue, not an international one. The weak savings rate in the U.S. can also be solved by changing the tax laws, again at a national level.

Basically, the argument I am making is that the markets are having problems because national politics are impinging too much on free markets. In that regard, the free market of ideas that is democracy can then adjust the national politics to achieve more healthy, free market results. The U.S. should lead the way by improving the savings rate and reducing the trade deficit. That would take many of the strains off of the world economy, and create the basis for another ten years of economic boom in the United States. Can our U.S. politicians get together and work on this after the November election? I certainly hope so.

Another area where Professor Gilpin is misfocused is in his concern about the growth of trading blocs like the EU and NAFTA. Actually, these blocs are creating freer markets within them and are an unavoidable precursor to creating the same level of freedom internationally with all countries. If there were three trading blocs in the world, they would simply merge into one at some point. That would be progress.

Complexity science tells us that having many countries pursuing their own ideas of economic prosperity will work better than having an internationally coordinated system. And the more intelligent, responsive, and focused those countries are, the better the whole system will work.

After you have finished reading this book, can you think of other places where we rely on precedent too much in our thinking rather than potential? If you find any of this happening in your own thinking, how can you learn to seek out better solutions rather than simply aping past solutions?

This is a higly readable and extensive survey of the major IPE issues facing Americans and the rest of the world today. It successfully analyzes and challenges the economists' arguments about the primacy of economics, or even economic theory, over politics or political science. This is an excellent book for someone just beginning to educate themselves about the nature and state of the international economy. It's significantly broad, but also does an excellent job of explaining complex phenomena. However, I have a few caveats. First, it moves too quickly and soflty over the larger issues, specifically, whether globalization has been helpful or harmful to the world polity. I agree with a previous review that it overestimates the threat of EU protectionism. In fact, he overestimates the threat of protectionism entirely. The greatest threat to, or promise against, globalization is the rise of social protest movements across the globe, being channeled in new ways not seen before. Therefore, I would urge most people to read this book, but then pick up either a contrarian book, like Grieder's One World: Ready or Not, or Globalization by Sasskia Sassen. Avoid Friedman's The Lexus and the Olive Tree at all costs.

Prof. Gilpin has an excellent reputation in the field of IPE, International Political Economy, and I bought this book on that recommendation.

It gives a good overview of major developments in the globalization and globalization debate in the 90s, with political economy analysis and lots of references to economic analysis. I would recommend it for graduate students, but I must say i was a bit disappointed, not much new or inspirational there. I could read it the book very quickly without ever really having to stop and think. Here i think it is only fair to reveal my own background, which is in international economic relations and history of EU integration. Some of his points on the nature and development of the European Union and the economics are frankly quite contestable, especially on the openness or closedness of the EU. The debate on 'Fortress Europe' is really out of date by now ever since it became clear that the Single European Act of 1987 and the '1992' project were not about closing the EU economy , quite the contrary. Do I detect an US bias here?

Yes, as prof. Gilpin points out, economists indeed disagree on many key issues. But you will find that strife also within IPE and political science and in any other social science discipline. So? It reflects the complexity of the issues rather than weakness of the discipline, i'd argue (but then, I would would I, as an economist...) A number of problems in globalization and the international financial system are presented as (relatively) new, but I'd argue that more often that not these problems were always there in history. Also, the point that regionalization threatens globalization is too strong as put there, and not necessarily correct and clear-cut at all: many regional economic agreements were made in the course of the Uruguay Round trade negotiations at GATT/WTO out of frustration with the slow pace of negotiations and as a 'back-up' plan in case of UR failure. Hardly a threat to globalization which, in any case, throughout history never really progressed smoothly at all.

All that said, the book does do a solid job of pointing out some of the main issues and discussions and it will do well as a topical reference book.

This little book is interesting, yet it seems to be hampered by its short format. As a result, the author does not seem wholly successful in describing a Confederate national consciousness . Basically, she argues that notions of evangelicalism, republicanism, and slavery merged into a national ideology; more significantly, she makes a good case that the contradictions within these ideological components effectively tore apart any widespread consensus by the war's end. Certainly, evangelicalism played an important role as Southern ministers became forceful speakers on the justification for war and, later, on the reasons for Southern defeat. Republicanism was a growing source of friction in Dixie in the years leading up to the war, often pitting planters against yeoman whites as elements of the market economy crept into Southern life. Faust's points on republicanism do little to explain a consensus among all whites in favor of Confederate support, though. Many planters attempted to tighten their control of political power in this era, and Faust seems to say they essentially tried to dupe or otherwise talk yeomen whites out of proactive political participation. There is not enough evidence presented here to accurately portray the relationship between different classes of whites. This point also relates to her proposition that a pro-slavery ideology pervaded the entire South and effectively brought about the War for Southern Independence. Faust does not explain why yeoman whites forgot the friction (particular in terms of economics) they increasingly felt during the late antebellum years for slaves and jumped immediately on a proslavery bandwagon. Basically, this book suffers from a common fault prevalent in studies of Southern history--it ignores or passes over the significant political differences between rich and poor whites throughout the South in an effort to brand slavery as the principal cause of the conflict.

Much of Faust's material is anecdotal, and while she does reference her sources extensively in the index (sadly stuck by itself at the back of the book), the constant quotes from "a planter," "a soldier's wife," or "a Methodist minister in North Carolina" are not placed in sufficient context and thus give the impression that the South was a hegemonic, monolithic entity wherein all white men thought alike. The source of this book is a series of lectures, and I feel that hampers the author's arguments--it never allows her to dig below the surface or argue her points to any great depth. Certainly, though, the subject of Confederate nationalism is a subject begging for more study. The topic is so intricate, though, that only a thick monograph filled with detailed argument can adequately address it.